The Libertarian Party Should Act Like One
The Libertarian Party Won't Survive Another Election as the Republican Party's Junior Partner
by Robby Soave
There have always been small-l libertarians and capital-L libertarians. Small-l libertarians say nice things about individual liberty, economic freedom, and small government. They may emphasize the libertarian-nature of the U.S.’s founding documents and the Framers’ philosophy. Some will indicate affinity for libertarianism in public opinion surveys, which puts their numbers at about one-in-ten Americans.
Small-l libertarians, however, are distinct from capital-L libertarians. The capital-L is reserved for those of us who participate in the libertarian movement and support its political organization, the Libertarian Party (LP). Even here, however, there are splits: Not everyone involved in the libertarian movement thinks the LP is a worthwhile enterprise. There are, of course, other libertarian organizations that seek to translate libertarian ideas into tangible policy results: the Cato Institute, Stand Together, and the Reason Foundation (where I work as a senior editor) are a few of them. But for those who wish to elect actual libertarians to positions of power in the government—so that they can take a hatchet to it directly—the LP is the only game in town.
And that’s where the frustration comes in, since at an organizational level, the LP has struggled greatly in recent years to present itself as something that appeals to libertarians, let alone to persuadable voters of other stripes. Fresh off a bout of considerable unpleasantness that has undeniably weakened the party—some would say sabotage is a more accurate term; bear with me—it’s clear the LP should re-position itself as an organization that sticks closely to libertarian principles and genuinely offers something distinct to gettable voters who are disenchanted with the major parties.
Yes, Republican and Democratic candidates should fear that they are about to lose votes to the LP and adjust their own positions accordingly. If the LP plays a role in forcing unwilling major parties to recalibrate toward liberty even slightly, that’s a win for the movement—but it is not by itself a win for the LP, which should focus on its own metrics: ballot access, electing state and local candidates, and general election performance in big campaigns.
What the LP cannot and should not do is sell out its own candidates to advance the interests of the plausibly more freedom-friendly major party figure, which is usually presumed to be the Republican. You may think that goes without saying; of course a political party should make electing its own candidates the highest goal by default. Sadly, this was not the view of the LP during 2024 presidential campaign.
A brief history lesson: The party was founded in 1971 and experienced its biggest success in 1980, earning just over one percent of the vote. The LP did not improve its performance in the subsequent decades, but by 2012, it had found a respectable-seeming standard-bearer: Gary Johnson, the former Republican governor of New Mexico. When Johnson re-ran in 2016—selecting as his running mate another socially liberal former Republican governor, Bill Weld of Massachusetts—it seemed like the stars had finally aligned.
Unfortunately, the Johnson-Weld ticket was in many ways disappointing, despite the historic opportunity to capitalize on dissatisfaction with the major party options: Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. Johnson developed a reputation as gaffe prone—even if the Aleppo moment was frankly unfair to him—and Weld’s contempt for Trump was so great that he seemed to fear that his own ticket’s success might hurt Clinton too much. (Note to Libertarians running for office: Do not evince a preference for Republicans or Democrats—when you do that, you are making the case for a candidate other than you.)
Despite these issues, Johnson had the best showing for an LP presidential candidate in history: 4.5 million votes, and more than 3 percent of the overall popular vote.
The 2020 campaign, which took place in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, was always going to be a challenge for third party candidates, who suffer horrible difficulties in drawing attention to their activities. Nevertheless, candidate Jo Jorgensen—who was virtually unknown except to party insiders—managed a respectable 1.8 million votes, and better than 1 percent of the popular vote.
Yet here the seeds of destruction were sowed: A faction of the party convinced itself that its nominees had not been libertarian enough. This was a fair knock against Johnson and Weld; it was not fair to Jorgensen whatsoever. The faction believed it earnestly, however. They called themselves the Mises Caucus. They got organized, and in 2022, they seized control of the LP and installed one of their leaders, Angela McArdle, as chair.
In the years that followed, the LP’s social media feed became more eager to engage in the kind of culture war battles that so animate the American right, and more favorable to Trump. For her part, McArdle seemed smitten with independent candidate Robert F. Kennedy Jr, who opposed COVID-19 era mandates but was otherwise not particularly libertarian. McArdle eventually invited Trump to speak at the 2024 Libertarian Convention, and allegedly bartered with him for the party’s tacit support, securing his pledge to free Ross Ulbricht—a libertarian cause célèbre—from prison.
Freeing Ross was an historic accomplishment for the LP. But in most other respects, the 2024 results were a huge disappointment. Having cozied up to Trump and RFK Jr.—and having worked behind the scenes to subvert the party’s own presidential candidate, Chase Oliver—the LP lost significant ground. Oliver came in fifth place, after Trump, Kamala Harris, RFK Jr., and Green Party candidate Jill Stein. This was the party’s worst ever placement. Moreover, the LP failed to qualify for the ballot in all 50 states, a major blow for the party’s organizational effort.
For McArdle, however, it was all part of the plan: Trump did free Ross, and he also promised to put a Libertarian in his Cabinet (with a capital-L!). When I interviewed her on Rising, the news show I co-host for The Hill, she seemed ecstatic about the results, and suggested she might try to do something like this again in the future.
But by February of 2025—just a few weeks into Trump’s second-term—McArdle resigned as chair following accusations of financial mismanagement. Michael Heise, her designated successor, failed to win the race to replace her, and the Mises Caucus abruptly lost its hold over party leadership. The new folks in charge have a lot of work to do in terms of restoring previous funding levels, qualifying for the ballot in all 50 states, and recruiting quality candidates who were scared off by the Mises Caucus.
Yet this must be their goal. It’s the only way forward for the party.
Under Mises Caucus leadership, the LP became far, far, far too friendly with the right, the Republican Party, and the Trump administration. It would be one thing for the LP to pull its punches if it were up against a truly libertarian-leaning Republican, like Sen. Rand Paul (R–Ky.) or Rep. Thomas Massie (R–Ky.). Quite obviously, the LP should not run against either of those two, and if Paul or Massie were somehow to become the GOP presidential candidate, then the LP should cross-endorse.
But except for that astonishingly unlikely situation, the LP should robustly challenge the two party duopoly by running its own candidates and standing by them.
Robby Soave is a senior editor at Reason magazine and the host of Rising for The Hill.

